Within Firmware

Why Real Firmware Makes Better Threat Simulators

Software extracted from real systems can improve training models and electronic warfare preparation.

On this page

  • Validating Simulated Behavior
  • Improving Training Realism
  • Updating Threat Models
Preview for Why Real Firmware Makes Better Threat Simulators

Introduction

Recovered firmware is valuable not only because it reveals how a captured military system works, but because it allows analysts to build threat simulators that behave like the real system rather than a theoretical approximation. In the context of reverse engineering foreign military technology, this shift is crucial. Training ranges, electronic-warfare laboratories, and operational test facilities all depend on models of adversary systems. When those models are based on actual firmware, configuration files, signal-processing routines, and decision logic extracted from recovered equipment, they can reproduce behaviours that would otherwise remain hidden. The result is more realistic training, more accurate threat assessments, and faster adaptation when foreign systems evolve.[U.S. Department of War]media.defense.govDepartment of WarUse of Foreign Materiel Exploitation ResultsSeptember 22, 2015 — 8 Oct 1997 — The Simulation Validation Office. Nationa…Published: September 22, 2015

Threat Modeling illustration 1

Why Real Firmware Makes Better Threat Simulators

Traditional threat simulation often began with observable characteristics: radar frequencies, missile ranges, flight profiles, or publicly known technical specifications. Those inputs remain important, but modern military systems increasingly derive their behaviour from software. Guidance laws, signal-classification routines, jammer responses, communication protocols, and fault-handling logic are frequently embedded in firmware rather than visible hardware.

A simulator built only from external observations may reproduce what a system appears to do under normal conditions. Firmware exploitation can reveal how it behaves under unusual conditions: when signals are degraded, when sensors disagree, when electronic attack is detected, or when communications are lost. Those edge cases often matter most during combat and testing. Reverse engineering organisations involved in foreign materiel exploitation explicitly combine firmware analysis, software reconstruction, modelling, and performance assessment to generate threat characterisations and countermeasure recommendations.[aurexdefense.com]aurexdefense.comOpen source on aurexdefense.com.

The distinction is comparable to the difference between observing a vehicle on a road and obtaining its engine-control software. External observation reveals performance; internal software reveals decision-making.

Validating Simulated Behaviour

Moving Beyond Assumptions

One of the persistent problems in military simulation is determining whether a threat model accurately represents reality. A radar simulator may reproduce known frequencies and pulse patterns, yet still fail to match how the actual radar prioritises targets or reacts to interference.

Recovered firmware helps close that gap. By examining embedded logic, analysts can compare simulated outputs against the real software’s responses under identical conditions. This process transforms threat modelling from educated estimation into evidence-based validation. Historical Department of Defense reviews have emphasised the need to revalidate threat simulators whenever new threat data become available, precisely because simulator accuracy degrades as foreign systems evolve.[U.S. Department of War]media.defense.govDepartment of WarUse of Foreign Materiel Exploitation ResultsSeptember 22, 2015 — 8 Oct 1997 — The Simulation Validation Office. Nationa…Published: September 22, 2015

Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing

Modern electronic-warfare development frequently relies on hardware-in-the-loop testing, in which real defensive equipment interacts with simulated threats. High-fidelity models of foreign radars, seekers, jammers, and warning receivers are used to test countermeasures before operational deployment. The closer those models are to the behaviour encoded in recovered firmware, the more confidence developers can have in the results.[Leidos]leidos.comElectronic WarfareDevelop threat simulators and other threat representations. Using data analysis, reverse engineering, threat weap…

In practice, firmware-derived models can expose discrepancies between assumed and actual threat behaviour. A defensive system that performs well against an estimated threat model may perform differently once the simulator incorporates authentic timing, signal-selection logic, or sensor-fusion routines recovered from real equipment.

Improving Training Realism

Military training systems aim to expose operators to realistic threat environments before they encounter them in combat. The challenge is that adversary systems rarely remain static. Software updates, modified threat libraries, altered waveforms, and new electronic-warfare techniques can change system behaviour without obvious external hardware changes.

Threat simulators used in training increasingly strive to replicate these evolving behaviours rather than merely reproduce legacy signal characteristics. Electronic-warfare training systems and range simulators are designed to generate threat indications that closely mirror real adversary systems so that crews learn appropriate recognition and response techniques.[Leonardo DRS]leonardodrs.comLeonardo DRSElectronic Warfare (EW) Threat SimulatorsEW Threat Simulators prepare combat pilots for missile threats. Our EW threat simula…

Firmware-derived information improves training realism in several ways:

  • Signal authenticity: Simulated emitters can reproduce actual waveform management and emission behaviour.
  • Decision realism: Threat reactions can follow the same software-driven logic used by the recovered system.
  • Failure realism: Operators can experience realistic degraded modes rather than idealised system performance.
  • Adaptive behaviour: Simulators can incorporate software-driven changes observed in updated firmware versions.

This is particularly important for electronic warfare, where crews often train against simulated radar and missile threats. If a threat simulator reflects authentic software behaviour, operators learn to respond to the same cues and timing they would encounter against the real system.[leonardodrs.com]leonardodrs.comLeonardo DRSElectronic Warfare (EW) Threat SimulatorsEW Threat Simulators prepare combat pilots for missile threats. Our EW threat simula…

Threat Modeling illustration 2

Updating Threat Models as Systems Evolve

Firmware as a Moving Target

A recurring lesson from modern defence technology is that software can change faster than hardware. A radar, drone, or missile may retain the same external appearance while receiving substantial software modifications that alter performance.

Because of this, threat modelling has increasingly become a continuous process rather than a one-time engineering exercise. Historical defence guidance emphasised revalidation whenever new threat information becomes available, recognising that simulator fidelity depends on current intelligence rather than historical assumptions.[U.S. Department of War]media.defense.govDepartment of WarUse of Foreign Materiel Exploitation ResultsSeptember 22, 2015 — 8 Oct 1997 — The Simulation Validation Office. Nationa…Published: September 22, 2015

Recovered firmware provides one of the most direct methods for identifying those changes. Analysts can compare firmware versions, identify modified routines, and determine whether behavioural models require updating. Even small software changes can alter:

  • Target-prioritisation logic.
  • Electronic counter-countermeasure responses.
  • Navigation and guidance behaviour.
  • Sensor-fusion algorithms.
  • Communication and networking procedures.

These discoveries can then be incorporated into simulators used for testing, operational planning, and training.

Threat Libraries and Electronic Warfare Databases

Electronic-warfare systems depend heavily on databases describing foreign emitters and behaviours. Reverse engineering and threat-system exploitation support the creation of detailed threat representations that feed these databases and the simulators built around them. The objective is not merely to catalogue signals but to understand the operational behaviour behind them.[Leidos]leidos.comElectronic WarfareDevelop threat simulators and other threat representations. Using data analysis, reverse engineering, threat weap…

As new firmware-derived information becomes available, threat libraries can be updated with revised behavioural models, ensuring that simulation environments remain aligned with the most current understanding of the threat.

The Limits of Firmware-Derived Simulation

Recovered firmware does not automatically produce a perfect simulator. Analysts may possess incomplete memory images, encrypted sections, missing hardware dependencies, or only fragments of a software stack. Modern embedded systems frequently depend on specialised processors, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), sensors, and peripherals whose behaviour must also be reconstructed.[arXiv]arxiv.orgarXiv AIM: Automatic Interrupt Modeling for Dynamic Firmware AnalysisAIM: Automatic Interrupt Modeling for Dynamic Firmware AnalysisDecember 2, 2023…Published: December 2, 2023

As a result, threat simulators are typically built from multiple evidence streams:

  • Firmware extraction and reverse engineering.[medium.com]medium.comUncovering Hidden Threats Through Hopper | by HorrowIn this article, we'll walk through a real-world example of reverse engineering a sus…
  • Hardware analysis.
  • Signal measurements.
  • Controlled testing.
  • Intelligence reporting.
  • Operational observations.

Firmware provides an unusually rich source of behavioural evidence, but it is usually combined with these other inputs before a model is considered reliable.

Threat Modeling illustration 3

Why Firmware-Based Threat Modelling Matters

The most significant contribution of recovered firmware is that it shifts threat simulation from modelling appearances to modelling behaviour. Instead of asking what a foreign system looks like, analysts can ask how it actually decides, reacts, prioritises, and adapts.

For training organisations, that means crews encounter more realistic adversary behaviour. For electronic-warfare developers, it means countermeasures can be tested against higher-fidelity threat representations. For intelligence analysts, it means threat assessments rest on observed software logic rather than assumptions about design intent. Across all three areas, recovered firmware narrows the gap between the simulated threat and the real one—a difference that becomes increasingly important as military capability migrates from hardware into code.[leidos.com]leidos.comElectronic WarfareDevelop threat simulators and other threat representations. Using data analysis, reverse engineering, threat weap…

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Endnotes

1. Source: media.defense.gov
Link:https://media.defense.gov/1997/Oct/08/2001715489/-1/-1/1/98-005.pdf

Source snippet

Department of WarUse of Foreign Materiel Exploitation ResultsSeptember 22, 2015 — 8 Oct 1997 — The Simulation Validation Office. Nationa...

Published: September 22, 2015

2. Source: leidos.com
Link:https://www.leidos.com/capabilities/cyber/electronic-warfare

Source snippet

Electronic WarfareDevelop threat simulators and other threat representations. Using data analysis, reverse engineering, threat weap...

3. Source: aurexdefense.com
Link:https://aurexdefense.com/capabilities/reverse-engineering-and-threat-exploitation

4. Source: media.defense.gov
Link:https://media.defense.gov/1992/Jul/15/2001714601/-1/-1/1/92-125.pdf

Source snippet

Department of WarDoD Management of Electronic Warfare Threat Simulators...15 Jul 1992 — The STRC uses EW systems, including the Mutes an...

5. Source: leonardodrs.com
Link:https://www.leonardodrs.com/what-we-do/products-and-services/electronic-warfare-ew-threat-simulators/

Source snippet

Leonardo DRSElectronic Warfare (EW) Threat SimulatorsEW Threat Simulators prepare combat pilots for missile threats. Our EW threat simula...

6. Source: arxiv.org
Title: arXiv AIM: Automatic Interrupt Modeling for Dynamic Firmware Analysis
Link:https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01195

Source snippet

AIM: Automatic Interrupt Modeling for Dynamic Firmware AnalysisDecember 2, 2023...

Published: December 2, 2023

7. Source: arxiv.org
Link:https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.06195

8. Source: sigmadefense.com
Link:https://sigmadefense.com/capabilities/electronic-warfare/

Source snippet

Electronic WarfareSigma Defense delivers electronic warfare capabilities for DoD, providing spectrum awareness, RF threat simulation, & t...

Additional References

9. Source: havelsan.com
Link:https://www.havelsan.com/en/beyond-today/electronic-warfare-preparedness

Source snippet

Electronic Warfare PreparednessEWTTR includes advanced radar systems instrumentation, enabling real-time acquisition and monitoring the p...

10. Source: medium.com
Link:https://medium.com/%40horrow49/decrypting-firmware-uncovering-hidden-threats-through-binary-reverse-engineering-with-hopper-a04d0f71b7ec

Source snippet

Uncovering Hidden Threats Through Hopper | by HorrowIn this article, we'll walk through a real-world example of reverse engineering a sus...

11. Source: dvidshub.net
Title: acquire assess exploit [nasic]({{ ‘nasic/’ | relative_url }}) reverse engineers advantage pilots and leaders
Link:https://www.dvidshub.net/news/216127/acquire-assess-exploit-nasic-reverse-engineers-advantage-pilots-and-leaders

Source snippet

NASIC reverse engineers an advantage for pilots and...12 Jan 2016 — “The screening process for those selected into the Air Force's Forei...

12. Source: youtube.com
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fD7IGLoDai8

Source snippet

EW Threat Simulators for Air Combat Training by Leonardo DRSEW Threat Simulators provide militaries with the open-air advanced threat rep...

13. Source: youtube.com
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gu2Ukf-xYRc

Source snippet

Electronic Warfare Threat Simulators for Air Combat TrainingIn modern air combat, preparation is everything. At Leonardo DRS, we equip wa...

14. Source: researchgate.net
Title: 352867415 Machine Learning Aided Electronic Warfare System
Link:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352867415_Machine_Learning_Aided_Electronic_Warfare_System

Source snippet

(PDF) Machine Learning Aided Electronic Warfare System20 May 2026 — In this article, a machine learning aided electronic warfare (EW) sys...

Published: May 2026

15. Source: textronsystems.com
Title: advancing mission success through electronic warfare
Link:https://www.textronsystems.com/our-company/news-events/articles/news/advancing-mission-success-through-electronic-warfare

Source snippet

Electronic Warfare Simulation11 Dec 2024 — The A 2 PATS simulation system provides a realistic and challenging environment for training a...

16. Source: astj.journals.ekb.eg
Title: article 418382 8b6db54403953cf7c0b775c8eda5ce1f
Link:https://astj.journals.ekb.eg/article_418382_8b6db54403953cf7c0b775c8eda5ce1f.pdf

Source snippet

Review of Real-time Military Training Simulator Based on...by N Hussen · 2025 · Cited by 6 — This paper introduces a review real-time mi...

17. Source: hardwear.io
Link:https://hardwear.io/tiny-embedded-systems-firmware-reverse-engineering-exploitation/

Source snippet

There are many other microcontroller architectures...Read more...

18. Source: researchgate.net
Link:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301317714_A_Survey_on_Chip_to_System_Reverse_Engineering

Source snippet

To inhibit RE for those with dishonest...Read more...

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